Denver Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 3

Article 4

1948

Vol. 25, no. 3: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
25 Dicta (1948).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

f
VOLUME

25

1948

f

The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
1948

Printed in U.S.A.

THE BRADFORD-ROBINSON PRINTING CO.
Denver, Colorado

IDT.TA
Vol. XXV

MARCH, 1948

No. 3

Calendar
April 5-Denver Bar Association regular monthly luncheon meeting, 12:15
P.M., Chamber of Commerce dining room.
May 3-Denver Bar Association regular monthly luncheon meeting, 12:15
P.M., Chamber of Commerce dining room. This is the annual election
meeting for the election of officers, trustees, and members of the Board of
Governors of the Colorado Bar Association, and is the final regular meeting until fall.
July 22, 23 and 24-Tenth Judicial Circuit annual conference, Post Office
.Bldg., Denver, Senior Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips presiding.
September 6, 7 8 and 9-American Bar Association annual meeting, Seattle,
Washington.

Judah P. Benjamin, Lawyer and Statesman
By HONORABLE JOHN W. DELEHANT
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska. An address before the Denver Bar Association,
February 3, 1947. Your editors regret that lack of space has
delayed the publication of this remarkable address until this
time.
I have decided to discuss before you the actual career of some eminently
successful practicing lawyer. Such a subject has a direct impact upon the
problems of men active at the bar. It frequently reminds them that, great or
small, their perplexities are neither wholly novel nor at all insoluble, but
have been encountered by other lawyers in other times and surmounted.
I, at least, always am, and most of my friends at the bar ordinarily are,
absorbingly interested in the careers of the authentically great men of our
calling. So, I resolved to refresh your recollection of an American lawyer
whose life and work have long intrigued me, whether they be regarded for
their contribution to the law, or appraised in their relation to American
history's most bitter crisis up to the present hour. My subject is Judah P.
Benjamin of New Orleans and London, though no two cities, not even the
entire English speaking world, can wholly provide the boundaries of his
active life.
In presenting these thoughts upon one of the ablest, and probably the
most dramatic and romantic of all American lawyers, I shall first recall for
you, all too summarily, a few of the incidents of his life and thereafter offer
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some thoughts to which it may well prompt us, particularly in a season of
perplexity.
Few men have been as ungenerous as he towards their biographers. He
deliberately sought to leave behind him no written record of his life. This
determination was prompted by the counsel of his original associate in the
practice of law who advised him never to retain personal records, or even the
files in a case beyond the period of its immediate pendency. That course was
pursued faithfully by Benjamin. And he also made no copies of letters which
he personally wrote, and destroyed the orginal letters which others sent to him.
Finally, at the termination of certain critical periods in his life, including the
weeks before its end, he devoted a considerable amount of time to the de,
struction of such material, casually and unintentionally accumulated, as might
come under the gaze of the curious. So, those who have sought to reconstruct
him for future generations have pursued their task under obvious difficulties.
Benjamin was born in 1811 in St. Croix, one of the presently designated
Virgin Islands of the United States, but then British territory, shortly to be
ceded to Denmark, which would exploit it for a century and more, and sell
it to us during the first World War. Thus, he was born a British subject, a
status he was never personally to renounce, for he became an American
citizen only through the naturalization, while he was a minor, of his father.
His parents had been married in London in 1808 and emigrated thence to the
islands in quest of financial success which seems always to have been beyond
the competence of his father. He was entirely of Jewish racial origin, his
mother being descended fromn the same Iberian Jewish strain that gave Britain
his contemporary, Benjamin Disraeli and, years later, was to give us Justice
Cardozo. And some of my well informed Jewish friends advise me that his
father undoubtedly was in substantial measure of the same stock, though, so
far as I am aware, his precise origin is somewhat obscure.
When he was about five years of age, and perhaps with some relation to
the cession of his native island to Denmark, the family removed to North
Carolina and later to Charleston, South Carolina, in both of which places his
mother had certain relatives, and his father participated in successive small
business ventures. The boy attended Fayetteville Academy in North Carolina
with conspicuous scholastic success, and at the age of fourteen entered Yale
University where he remained until he was nearly seventeen. His formal
education was ended without graduation, chiefly, it seems, in consequence of
financial reverses suffered by his father, though it is probable that friends had
substantially assisted in the payment of his expenses both in the academy
and at Yale.
But so mature and thorough was the formal instruction, thus early terminated, that he had acquired a thirst and capacity for cultural learning which
prompted him to unremitting and lifelong private study, with the result that,
years later, his scholarly friend, Thomas F. Bayard, could write of him: "He
excelled in conversation, with an easy flow of diction, embellished by a singu-
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lar mastery of languages at the base of which lay the Latin and its fibres of
the French and Spanish." Similarly, when the great Senator George G. Vest,
years after the Civil War, inquired of a veteran reporter of the United States
Senate whose familiarity with that body encompassed the golden age of
Webster, Clay and Calhoun, who within his memory was the most finished
scholar in the senate, the answer was: "By all odds, Mr. Benjamin of
Louisiana."
On leaving the university, Benjamin tarried only briefly in Charleston
where his family then lived, and proceeded promptly to New Oleans, whose
location was a portent of its commanding position in the commercial life of
the still undeveloped Louisiana territory. Beside its wharves passed the great
river, the artery of commerce; below it lay the ocean, highway to every port
in the world; and above and westerly beyond it stretched a virgin empire.
There is evidence that none of these factors escaped the youth's observation.
Bent upon the study of law, he promptly secured employment at the age
of seventeen with the leading notary and conveyancer in the city and supplemented his earnings by tutoring young members of prosperous families, though
in some instances, his teaching was upon the basis of barter in which he exchanged tuition in English for instruction in French and Spanish, whose practical mastery was to be of immense advantage to him in that multilingual
metropolis. Without relaxing his efforts in the way of gainful employment,
he shortly entered upon the study of law in a prominent office, worked almost
superhumanly, and at the end of four years, or in 1832, entered upon the
practice of his profession.
Within three months of his call to the bar he married; and in any
appraisal of Benjamin's life, the impact upon it of his marriage must be considered. His bride was a gentile, in fact an aristocratic girl of mixed European
French and Creole stock; beautiful and talented, though not highly educated;
a stern Catholic, in whose practical religion, ardor and intensity were ingredients far more discernible than Christian charity; selfish, ambitious, vain and
wantonly extravagant. After some years of indulgence by her husband, she
wearied of the want of cosmopolitanism in New Orleans, and removed to
Paris, there to spend with her daughter, and their only child, the rest of her
life with the exception of a single brief and disastrous attempt to live in
Washington. But this unnatural behavior on her part did not alienate her
husband nor induce any estrangement between them. He supported her
lavishly in Paris; repaired there annually to be with her, save only for the
long interval of the Civil War; and finally spent the months of his retirement
with her and their daughter in the palatial dwelling which he had erected
in the French capital; and died, also in those surroundings. To this eccentric
marital course may be referred some measure of Benjamin's utter absorption
in his profession and his public career. Its financial exactions from him were
imperative and prodigious; and it liberated him from the normal distractions
of domesticity and left him free to yield to his impulse towards concentrated
work.
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Before leaving this intimately personal aspect of his career, it is appropriate to make a further observation. Benjamin has sometimes been referred
to as an apostate from the faith of his fathers. But such a notion appears to be
ill-founded. It probably rests almost entirely upon the fact that his funeral
services were conducted in a church of the faith of his wife and daughter and
he is buried in the celebrated Pere LaChaise cemetery. But a reasonable familiarity with French elasticity in such matters refers them rather to a courtesy
toward his family than to an appraisal of his own ecclesiastical status. The
truth appears to be that though, even as a youth, and for reasons too complex
for present discussion, he became remiss in the observance of the religious
practices of Judaism, he never abandoned his basic faith in it, and throughout
his life remained justly proud of his racial origin.
His industry and diligence were quickly rewarded with success at the
bar. Rarely seen in criminal proceedings, he was a master of the field of
commercial jurisprudence, for which New Orleans was so admirably situated.
Thus, by the time he was thirty-six years of age, the press of New Orleans,
and the annals of its bar placed him among the acknowledged leaders of its
lawyers, and he was already a wealthy man.
But at about that point in his life also, adversity first overtook him. His
almost incessant application to study resulted in the impairment of his vision
in such measure that he could not read. So, he abandoned the law and devoted himself exclusively to the operation and expansion of a large sugar plantation below New Orleans in which he had already invested large sums of
money gained in his practice and where he built the beautiful and costly
"Bellechasse" mansion. That business initially flourished, and Benjamin invested profitably a great deal of money in scientific and mechanical improvements in the production and refinement of sugar. In fact, lecturing before
learned societies and publishing articles in scientific magazines, he became one
of the leading authorities of the world upon the technical side of the sugar
industry. However, his striking success as a sugar planter, though solidly
grounded, was brief. For after a few years a destructive flood ruined his
plantation and his collapse was completed by his payment of a friend's note
for $60,000 which he had endorsed with the usual consequence of that
gracious gesture.
Fortunately, his relief during some five years from the law's drudgery
had resulted in the restoration to full effectiveness of his vision and he returned to his legal practice. His success upon this second service of the law was
immediate and striking. It carried him shortly into a substantial share of the
larger cases pending in the New Orleans courts and before the state's supreme
court. It involved him in litigation and business negotiations in remote California, Texas, and Mexico. And it led him to a position of acknowledged
eminence among the advocates before the bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Some measure of his standing at the American bar may be
discerned in the tender to him both by President Fillmore and by President
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Pierce of an appointment to membership on the Supreme Court which he
declined for a two-fold reason; first, because his financial contributions to his
immediate family and his other relatives far exceeded the salary of a justice
of that court, and secondly, because he preferred the life of the advocate and
the active political career in which by that time he was well advanced.
And that suggests a fleeting and inadequate glance-for time will allow
no more-at Benjamin's public career in America, for it is a part both of the
man and of the lawyer. In the United States of the three decades preceding
the Civil War, it was quite the normal thing for an eminently successful
lawyer to be, at the same time, vigorously and officially involved in public life.
Even before the temporary abandonment, for the sake of his vision, of his
legal career, he had become a considerable factor in the political life of New
Orleans and Louisiana. In 1842, after a bitter campaign, he was elected to
the lower house of the Louisiana General Assembly, as a Whig, for he originally adhered to the party of Clay and Webster. From that time forth until
he left our shores, he was continuously involved in political controversy, and
with a few interludes engaged in the holding of public office. In 1844 and
1845 he took a conspicuous part in the remaking of the constitutibn of Louisiana as a member of the constitutional convention. In 1851 he was elected as
a member of the state senate of Louisiana, and served through its 1852 session.
It is interesting that this legislature, of which he was a member, elected him
to the United States Senate for a term commencing in 1853, and that, thus
elected, he remained in the legislature and in the very center of its many
violent controversies; and that, also in the interval prior to assuming his duties
in the national senate, he sought and obtained election to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1852, its second in seven years, and in that convention led the prevailing and controlling group of delegates.
If his public career had consisted of nothing more than his service in the
United States Senate, that alone would have marked him for distinction. He
entered that body on March 4, 1853 with the inauguration of President
Franklin Pierce, less than three years after the deaths of Clay and Calhoun
and only months after Webster's death, and his tenure ended with the attempted sundering of the Union after the election of Abraham Lincoln. Taking the oath with him were the new senators, Sam Houston of Texas, and
Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. Elected as a Whig, he repudiated his party
midway in his term, and became a Democrat. Despite that usually suicidal
gesture and the antipathy which it engendered among his former associates
and the diffidence of his new political bedfellows, he was reelected in 1859
for a second six-year term. But he forsook the senate on February 4, 1861
to cast his lot, in the then gathering struggle, with the state of Louisiana and
shortly with the confederacy.
I wish I might forget the proper limitations of time, and quote for you
passages from some of the celebrated speeches which he delivered in the
senate. There is eloquence in them; and scholarship, and beauty, and logic,
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and pathos. For, of such ingredients is true eloquence compounded. To be sure
he spoke in a season of tragic and desperate earnestness, calculated to inspire
high sentiments and evoke magnificent diction. But Benjamin was capable
of both.
He appreciated how generously the United States had dealt with him.
As a consummate realist, he appraised maturely the superior might of union
in contrast with the infirmity of discordant elements of a broken nation. And
he espoused secession with frank reluctance and took a restrained and sobered
view of the prospects of southern success. Yet, as a senator he was consistently
the masterly lawyer. In perhaps a half dozen genuinely great addresses upon
the senate floor, he vindicated the logic of -the position of the withdrawing
states, whose only historic answer was the voice of restraining might. Most
notable of all was his final effort, upon which he resigned and departed from
the senate. Of it no friend, but a general of the Union army, has written:
"Iheard the farewell speeches of Senators Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and
Benjamin of Louisiana. Mr. Benjamin appeared to me essentially different
from Mr. Davis. Notwithstanding his incomparable abilities and the fact that
he became a secessionist with great reluctance, he never excited animosity in
me or in any other northern man so far as I am aware. When I listened to
his last speech in the senate, I was transported out of myself. Such verbal
harmony I had never heard before! There was neither violence in his action
nor anger in his tone, but a pathos that lulled my senses like an opiate that
fills the mind with delightful illusions. I was conscious that it was Senator
Benjamin who spoke, and that his themes were mighty wrongs and desperate
remedies; but his words I could not recite; nor can I yet recall them. Memory,
however, restores the illusive pleasure they left, which is like the impression
I retain of my youthful days." The tribute itself is sheer eloquence, but for
its vindication I invite you to read the speech and its predecessors in their
entirety.
Remember, too, that Benjamin coupled a very large and lucrative law
practice with the performance of his senatorial duties. While in Washington
he appeared repeatedly before the Supreme Court; and during senatorial
holidays then much longer than in 1947, he was probably the busiest lawyer in
Louisiana, particularly before its Supreme Court.
The magnitude of his practice during that period before the Supreme
Court of the United States may be understood when it is remembered that
he appeared on retainers in substantial cases arising in many states, and that
during the decade of the 1850's his cases there were surpassed in number
only by those of the aging Reverdy Johnson, who had succeeded to the preeminence held by Webster on the latter's illness resulting in his death in 1852.
But March of 1861 saw an end of all this. For, almost immediately upon
withdrawing from the senate, he left New Orleans for a conference at Montgomery, the first capital of the confederacy, never again to see the city of
his residence or the members of his family left dwelling there. It was not
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possible for one of his great ability to remain aloof from the government of
the Confederate States; and the truth is that he sought no abstention.
First, as attorney-general and later as both attorney-general and secretary
of war of the new government, he was only doubtfully successful. The task
of the confederate secretary of war was destined to be thankless and superhuman, in view of the resolution of Mr. Davis, a West Point graduate and
professional soldier and late secretary of war of the United States, to direct
the armies of his ill-starred country. But, shortly, Benjamin was relieved of
these offices and made secretary of state where he served brilliantly until all
was lost.
I must pass over this interlude of authentic statesmanship, though I do it
with acknowledged reluctance. If my audience, instead of lawyers, were a
class in American history or government, those four years and slightly more,
would be a subject appropriate for a dozen lectures, for, through Benjamin's
life during them, flows the very history of the confederacy. His correspondence
with Mason and Slidell, the commissioners and advocates of the confederate
states, at the courts of St. James and the Emperor Louis Napoleon, respectively,
is a drama whose theme is the alternating confidence, despair and hope and
the final disaster of the short lived republic. And it required Mr. Benjamin,
the lawyer, for its leading character.
But with Appomatox and the subsequent flight of the Davis government,
the secretary, realizing that in the northern states he was the most hated man
of the defeated confederacy, resolved upon a self imposed exile, and by successive disguises, managed to elude the pursuit of the federal soldiers and to
escape, first to Cuba, thence, through the Caribbean Islands, and finally, after
months of journeying including at least two nearly fatal shipwrecks, to England.
And so, at the age of fifty-four, this man who had already lived more
abundantly than most people may anticipate from a century, found himself
in the very heart and center of conservative inhospitality, an exile from the
soil on which he had earned renown, with a price offered for his capture and
return to a vindictive retribution. Too, with very heavy obligations for the
support of his family he was in precarious financial condition. For, though
he had lately invested all his remaining and available fortune except his lands
in southern cotton, of which some eight hundred bales had shrewdly been
placed on board ship for England, barely a hundred bales, and these in damaged condition, escaped the vigilance of northern ships and the ravages of
storm and reached England. However, the price per bale was such that he
realized twenty thousand dollars out of what, without disaster, would have
been a comfortable fortune. And this twenty thousand dollars, with prudent
rationing, provided him with the means for his family's support pending the
restoration of his earning capacity.
The talents of their newly arrived guest were not unknown to the English,
who though cautious about offending the now successful North, had quite
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generally desired a confederate victory and stood ready to deal kindly with
Benjamin as a token of their actual preference in the rebellion. Accordingly,
British journalism tempted him with flattering offers of employment in literary
pursuits, which he accepted only to the extent of contributing special articles
to periodicals, yield him less than enough for his personal subsistence pending his call to the bar.
For he resolved early-if indeed there was every question on the scoreto prepare for the English bar. His birth on British soil provided him with
the requisite British citizenship. But formal study and preparation were imperative notwithstanding his recognized learning. So, on January 13, 1866
he enrolled as a student of law at Lincoln's Inn With Charles Pollock, the son
of Sir Frederick, and himself later Baron Pollock, as his instructor, and with
no assurance that the customary three years of apprenticeship would be forgiven. But, to his gratification, on June 6, 1866, he was dispensed from the
rest of his term and called to the bar.
This is the place at which his famous text on "Sales" should be mentioned, for it was at this period in his career that it was projected. I have
heard it asserted mistakenly that he wrote the volume while he was a student
at the inns of court. He actually wrote it in the first two years of his career
as an English barrister, those years that were calculated to be lean for him
as their counterparts have been for every one of us; and it was published in
1868. Extant originals of letters he wrote to friends and his sisters show that
his purpose in writing it was to cover a then textually unexplored field of
law with a degree of skill that would challenge the attention to his learning of
the British bar and commercial interests; and that he hoped for little if any
profit directly from the sales of the work, a prospect that was probably accurately appraised. This was not his first venture into legal literature; and
the former one was undertaken at a comparable period in his New Orleans
professional career. When he was admitted to the Louisiana bar there was
no available digest of the Spanish and French decisions in the area's territorial
period or of the opinions of the Louisiana Supreme Court up to that point.
Accordingly, and originally for his own use in his practice, Benjamin prepared in his beautiful and careful longhand script such a digest in textual
form. But by the time he had been in practice for two years its fame among
Louisiana lawyers had grown to such an extent that he had revised and published it in association with his lifelong friend and his fellow student at Yale,
Thomas Slidell, later Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, and
brother, as I recall, of John Slidell who was to be Benjamin's associate in the
United States Senate and the confederacy's representative in England under
Benjamin's guidance.
His success at the English bar was astonishing, even if it did not achieve
the logarythmic proportions sometimes claimed for it. The minimum reality
is almost incredible. From sources that, so far as they extend are accurate and
reflect his earnings at figures below which they certainly did not fall, it is
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shown that in the third year of his practice there, he received more than five
thousand dollars in net fees; that they rose quickly to approximately ninety
thousand dollars per year, and that in the sixteen years of his practice, he
received in net fees, no less than seven hundred fifty thousand dollars. It is
claimed, though it is not demonstrable, that for several years his income exceeded one hundred twenty thousand dollars annually. All this on the purely
material side.
In professional standing his English legal career was even more exceptional.
He was made Queen's Counsel in 1872 and shortly thereafter was accorded a
patent of preference. So great became the demand for his services that he
was finally compelled to limit his advocacy to cases before the House of Lords
and the Privy Council. The most eloquent evidence of the appraisal of his
ability and merit is to be found in the fact that when, in June of 1883 he felt
constrained, from considerations of health, to retire from practice to the home.
of his wife and daughter in Paris where, a year later he was to die, he was
accorded the then unprecedented honor of a farewell testimonal dinner by the
barristers of England, attended by the acknowledged leaders of the bench and
bar of the nation.
Many factors undoubtedly conspired in the achievement of this final one
of what were actually his three careers at the bar. Some were political, some
local. Probably, as has been asserted, he was regarded with initial and auspicious favor by the wealthy tory class of British society, politics, and finance, who
had actually desired the defeat of the federal cause in the Civil War and the
confusion and ultimate destruction of the upstart nation builded from Britain's
rebel American colonies. And, certainly, he was shrewd in seeking his practice chiefly in the industrial north of England with particular orientation to
Liverpool whither his fame as a lawyer had preceded him, in consequence of
the commercial relations between Liverpool and New Orleans.
But I need not remind the members of a bar association that whatever
introductory favor might have issued from those factors, they were not, alone,
or even principally responsible for his success.
The cause of that was Benjamin, his vast and cosmopolitan learning, his
tireless industry, his striking personality, in fine the man in his entirety. Upon
one only of these elements need I dilate. His success argues for the rest.
But remember that he was first broadly educated basically, and then schooled
with almost equal accuracy in the common law, in the civil law as modified
by the Code Napoleon, and in the Spanish law. This diversified scholarship
had stood him in good stead in young and developing Louisiana. It is reflected
in the text of the original volume on Sales. And it was invaluable in the
equipment of the leader of the bar of the center of the commercial empire
then maturing under the reign of Victoria and the rival policies of Gladstone
and Beaconsfield.
His method in presenting an argument, either orally or in writing, to a
court or judge was singular. Invariably, he opened an argument or brief
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with a closely reasoned analysis of the abstract legal position which he felt
called upon to maintain. And, this done, he proceeded to articulate the facts
of his pending case into the iaw which he had already demonstrated to be valid.
Many English barristers and A-I-erican lawyers have remarked upon the striking effectiveness of this order of presentation under his masterly employment.
I have long regarded a recollection of Mr. Benjamin's career as an antidote to the temptation to despair to which we in the profession are not infrequently subjected. I can not think of any American-noteven Abraham
Lincoln realistically rescued from juvenile texts on history-who, more repeatedly and more triumphantly than Benjamin, survived that inclination.
On at least three major occasions-and and at other times to some extenthe saw his financial fortunes in ruins. The rich Belleschasse plantation was almost completely destroyed. At least two other business ventures, which time
has forbidden me to mention, collapsed to leave him virtually bankrupt. The
Civil War and its tragic end despoiled him of a fortune in real estate and
left him with only a salvaged fraction of his personal holdings, quite inadequate, for any substantial period, to meet the demands made upon him by his
family. Approximately eight years before his retirement he made an outlay
of every asset he possessed to provide a dowry of three thousand dollars per
year for his daughter whom he dearly loved. And from that point he proceeded, notwithstanding the subsequent expenditure of eight-five thousand
dollars in the erection of the new Paris home for his family, to accumulate
a final fortune which on his death, included personal property appraised at
more than three hundred thousand dollars.
His devotion to his family, both his wife and daughter, and his mother and
sisters was notable. I have already adverted to the eccentricity of his own
domestic career. Despite its irregularity, it seems never to have embittered
him or tempted him to cynicism or to any disordered living. Discord appears
to have separated his parents with the consequence that Benjamin assumed
the responsibility for the support of his mother and two of his sisters, one
unmarried, and the other a widow. He maintained them in luxury and delighted in making lavish presents to his nephews and nieces. Quite incidentally,
two sons of one of his sisters were Mr. E. B. Kruttschnitt, a distinguished
member of the New Orleans bar at the change of the centuries, and Mr. Julius
Kruttschnitt, late president of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.
The collapse of the confederacy, and his own status as a hunted traitor,
left him sorrowful, indeed, but neither despairing nor complaining. He took
his plight quite philosophically. In fact, it would be difficult to discover
correspondence more ebullient and more uniformly cheerful than the letters
he wrote to his sisters during his several enforced pauses at island havens in
the course of his hazardous and frequently interrupted journey of escape from
Florida to England in 1865. Recognizing that his former distinguished career
had definitely and permanently ended in obloquy and in material failure;
that his present was perilous both physically and financially, and his future
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quite inscrutable, he, nevertheless, refused to descend to pessimism, persisted
in good cheer, and spoke confidently of then incubating plans for the reestablishment of his fame and fortune. For us who are wont to bewail a
single blighted aspiration, he is surely an exemplar of hope.
But perhaps his most unique characteristic was his ostensible indifference
to criticism and calumny. The adjective "ostensible" should not be neglected;
for it is hardly to be supposed that a nature as sensitive as his could remain
unwounded by the bitter personal recrimination to which he was almost constantly subjected throughout his American career. He literally lived in the
midst of controversy; and much of it was undoubtedly inspired by his own
success, his bearing, and his subtle and fastidious personality. I shall offer here
no adequate catalogue or examination of the accusations brought against him,
although without a knowledge of them, it is quite impossible to understand the
man or to appraise his career. Not all of them were without foundation,
though certainly most of them were rooted in the malice and intemperance
of the time and events, during which he lived so actively and daringly and
brilliantly.
His financial speculations and promotions, whose index extends from
purely personal investments to semi-public ventures in several railroads, both
in the southern states, in Texas and in Mexico, and mining operations in
California, and Guano development in South America were often stigmatized
as chimerical or worse. In his political career, he was censured for the frequent changes in his publicly expressed opinons and programs, for electoral
manipulations, and especially for the advocacy of concrete measures cherished
by his properous and generous professional clientele. He was cruelly pilloried
because of the circumstances of his domestic life, although I am unaware of
any charge against his personal morals. His racial origin was constantly urged
against him. He was even charged seriously with adherence to the "knownothing" movement; he whose birth had occurred on foreign soil, whose
family was Jewish; and whose cherished-wife and daughter were Roman
Catholic. But personal and political hatreds have never made a virtue of
sanity or a vice of intrinsic incongruity.
His great learning, ability, and industry made him the natural and acknowledged director of any project to which he bent his efforts; and the confederacy was no exception to this rule. He was recognized as the intellect of
the rebellion; the framer of its constitution and principal laws; the inspiration
of its propaganda; and especially the genius of its diplomacy. Quite naturally,
therefore, all of the intolerant hatred of which the North was so notoriously
capable descended on his person. Its variety was almost infinite for he was
absurdedly charged with the creation of projects ranging from local southern
cruelty to federal soldiers, through the depressing harshness of Andersonville,
to the attempted burning of New York City. He was, in utter reality, the
whipping boy of the confederate states.
The very acuteness of his intellect made him a target for such calumnies.
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For without particularization, of which a startling documentation could be
drawn from the history of races, nations, philosophy and religion, I merely
remind you that, in seasons of controversy, one's intellectual capacity for
brilliant and subtle reasoning is a temptation to suspicion and criticism from
small and obtuse minds.
In the face of such attacks Benjamin, with almost no departures, maintained a consistent practice. He denied nothing; he answered nothing; with
the natural consequence that his tormentors were uniformly infuriated, and
often confounded.
The outstanding instance in which he departed from this rule of silence
under attack may be mentioned. In 1861, with the incipient war's hatred
at its height, a story was circulated through the northern press which found its
way to the south, that he had left Yale to avoid expulsion after being detected
in a series of petty thefts of personal articles and money from fellow students.
Benjamin who had ignored so many accusations of major adult misconduct
was singularly roused to rage over this charge, brought more than thirty years
after the event, of misconduct at the age of sixteen years. Our of the ensuing
controversy two facts emerge as probable. It is likely that he did leave the
university under some disciplinary stricture, as well as from considerations
of financial necessity, But, on the other hand, the specific accusation made
against him stands unproved and intrinsically suspicious on at least two
grounds; first, it is exact and meticulous as to date and attributes the occurrence
to a time more than a year after Benjamin had certainly left Yale; secondly,
its origin has been traced to two fanatically anti-semetic and anti-slavery
clergymen writing in The Independent, an abolitionist organ under the editorship of Henry Ward Beecher, who was himself no paragon either of virtue
or of intellectual honesty, but rather a first-rate calumniator.
So much, by way of hurried recollection, of a great lawyer and statesman.
I do not vainly imagine that I have portrayed for you either the life, or the
character, or the abilities of Benjamin. But I do allow myself the hope that
I may have provoked one or another of you to examine the literature touching
him, and thereby to catch a glimpse of what intelligence, study and industry
did for one man, not always under favorhble auspices, and may-who knowsstill do for a rare soul who has the good fortune to possess and manifest them.
I close with one further comment. After writing this paper down to
the end of the last preceding paragraph, I found myself prompted to read
a new volume on Benjamin's life, entitled "Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate
Statesman" published in 1943 and written by Professor Robert Douthat Meade.
It is an orderly and scholarly biography in the modern method. But I have
not been prompted by it to any revision of the foregoing comments. The
truth is that it leans quite heavily and with commendable frankness on a
biography published in 1906 by Pierce Butler-not the judge, but a southern
scholar of Irish descent bearing the distinguished name-and on Butler's mateiial and bibliography. These, I think, are the principal works of broad scope
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upon the subject; and between them, particularly for literary style, I am
rather inclined to prefer Butler's effort. But that is an arguable conclusion.
The Meade volume is altogether excellent and reflects a high measure of critical
scholarship.
From our standpoint as lawyers, it is to be regretted that some competent
legal scholar has not been prompted to prepare a biographical study of him
will repay the reading; and that will be doubly certain if the writer will only
with special emphasis on Benjamin the lawyer. Perhaps he may yet beckon
to a Beveridge of a later generation; and if he does, I am sure that the result
behold his subject in its true context, and not endeavor wholly to divorce the
lawyer from the statesman, the politician, and the man.

Uniformity in Procedural Matters as Contributing
To The Administration of Justice
By

VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.

Professor of Law, University of Denver, School of Law. An

address before the annual conference of the Tenth Judicial
Circuit, Denver, Colorado June 13, 1947.
In considering the problem of uniformity, we have first to decide exactly
how broad we intend this uniformity to be. It is one thing to talk about
uniformity in procedure and another thing to talk about uniformity in the
interpretation of the rules of substantive law; one thing to talk about uniformity in either aspect within the federal courts alone, and another thing
to talk about that same uniformity as extended to all the courts of all the 48
states as well as to all the federal courts. There at least purports to be a
uniformity of procedure among the various federal courts, at all levels, in
the vast majority of cases coming within their jurisdiction in either the civil
or criminal field, and regardless of the state in which that court may be sitting.
So, we have at least a framework upon which has been started an already
large and a steadily growing body of case law related to the purely procedural
field. A8 to how adequate that will be remains to be determined from that
mass of future case law yet unmade.
So far as a uniformity of procedure in that over-all picture which includes
the courts of all jurisdictions, we do not, at present, have even a good start
to achieve that end. Some effort has been expended in that direction by the
adoption of rules of procedure designed after the federal rules, with appro,
priate changes, as has been done in this state. But such instances are notable
because they are unusual, and not because they in any way indicate a trend.
Because of this actual picture-uniformity on the one hand and an almost
total lack of uniformity on the other-we can form an opinion of some value
as to the desirability of the practice.
Before discussing this at greater length, it might be well to dismiss with
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a word, as calling for more discussion than this opportunity affords the time
for, the matter of uniformity in the interpretation of the rules of substantive
law. There was a time when there was every reason to believe that a tendency in that direction was being indicated by the federal courts. But the
much discussed decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins may well justify the
inference that whatever start had been made in that direction has now become
more difficult, if not impossible, of realization so long as that case stands as
law. Perhaps the Supreme Court was motivated by an unspoken feeling that
such uniformity was not desirable. There are many who will subscribe to
that view. And the issue can be argued most persuasively at length on either
side. We shall advert to this decision later on.
Before considering the controversial question as to whether a uniformity
of procedure is desirable or not, it is appropriate to see what results have
been achieved under a system which purports to encourage uniformity. If
uniformity is ever desirable, it should be so in those courts which constitute
one large judicial system within themselves. I refer, of course, to the federal
court system, in which all cases are potentially subject to the rules of decision
of the United States Supreme Court and in which all courts may be guided
by the mandates of that high court. But such a view of the matter is only
theoretical, for it is obvious that it would be impossible for the Supreme Court
to resolve all possible problems of procedure as they arise, nor, indeed, is it
to be expected that the court will even attempt to do so. And even if it did,
the lapse of time necessary to a full determination of the possible questions
would almost surely result in a continual necessity for further review of
those older decisions which changing conditions indicate require revision.
But this practical approach actually begs the question of the desirability
of such a condition. Let us assume that it were possible to secure a prompt
and complete body of decision by the Supreme Court on all basic and significant problems that could arise under the rules, and that all of the federal
courts could interpret these decisions uniformly and apply them in a substantially similar manner to the fact situations in all cases. Would it be desirable, even then?
This question, it seems to me, can only be answered in the light of the
obvious fact that we do not have an omniscient judiciary in the high court.
This is, of course, not peculiarly true of this court, inhering in all human
institutions. If rules of procedure sufficiently detailed and sufficiently inclusive to assure uniformity are to be interpreted by one court, we might
assure ourselves of a procedural system as rigidly fixed in its course as are the
planets in their orbits. That is conceivably possible, but is it desirable? Will
it promote justice? And if the concept of uniformity is not carried to this
extreme, how can it be uniformity? For example, if a circuit court, by a
unanimous decision, decides that a well established rule of procedure must now
be departed from, and writes a decision well calculated to induce the Supreme
Court to follow in its footsteps, there are two courses open. The Supreme
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Court may reverse because the rule has not been followed, or it may affirm,
on the theory that the rule must be changed. If it reverses, it thereby discourages all original thinking by the lower courts, and repeated reversals made
necessary by the persistancy of a few brave judicial souls will only serve the
more to discourage further departures into those paths of experiment which
have marked the way for so many new and desirable concepts of the purpose
of law. If the Supreme Court affirms, it thereby admits that the rule is not
to be one that can be depended upon to apply in every case, unchanged and
unchanging. And that means that the concept of uniformity is gone, for
then any lower federal court may, with impunity, interpret any rule as it
pleases, with the hope, and perhaps the expectation, that its interpretation
will later be approved. Thus we ultimately arrive at the point where we
started.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, we know that the courts differ in
their interpretation of the decisions of the Supreme Court. For example, the
recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Hickman v. Taylor, which has
been the inspiration for so much comment, and which is known to all of you
here, did not actually involve the question of privilege in connection with
the taking of interrogatories under rule 33, although both the Circuit Court
and the Supreme Court tentatively suggested that the privilege rule should
apply to rule 33. This was dictum. What was actually decided in that case
was that discovery proceedings under rtble 33 could not be used to secure
disclosure of what the Circuit Court called the "work product of the lawyer".
That would seem to be clear enough. Yet already, the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in December 1945,
in Terrell v. Standard Oil Co., 5 F.R.D. 510, said: "In view of the very recent
decision in the Hickman case, I will not require the defendant to answer
interrogatories 39 and 40, since, as put, they refer to privileged matters." The
court clearly misinterpreted the Hickman case. Uniformity, if it means anything, should include the ability of all trial courts to apply the rules of procedure in the manner indicated by the Supreme Court. But we know, of
course, that any assumption that the trial courts can do so is a false assumption
as to the extent of their ability.
But perhaps we take too narrow a view of the meaning of uniformity
in the administration of justice. The courts, after all, take a just pride in
their ability to see through the form into the substance, and have never intended that rules of procedure shall be treated as so many patterns to be
pulled out of the appropriate pigeon-hole. The rules, it may be said, were
drawn with sufficient flexibility so that they could be made to fit any case
and at the same time fall into their proper places in a total picture, the over-all
effect of which will apply in a certain way to a given fact situation under all
circumstances. The difficulty is that it is not, or at least has not so far been,
possible to draft any set of rules to assure that result. Already experience has
proven that the rules need some clarification and extensive amendments have
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been adopted, to become effective soon. These amendments will doubtless
require many more interpretive cases, some, perhaps, enunciating rules of procedure different than those to be followed under the rules as they now exist,
thus introducing still further conflicts to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
The very amendments themselves, designed to assure further uniformity, will
be the source of divergent constructions, and if we wish to take the chance of
making a prediction, will appear to require still further amendments, and so
ad infinitum. I believe that uniformity either as it becomes apparently fixed
by judicial interpretation of a set of rules, or as it is attempted to be embodied
in the rules themselves by a complete coverage of the subject matter, with
amendments when needed, is an impossible ideal.
But the fact that an end is not possible of achievement in its entirety
will not necessarily require an abandonment of all efforts toward that end.
It may be that whatever is achieved in that direction is a worthwhile gain,
though complete realization is impossible. Certainly some uniformity of practice under some sort of rules will achieve many desirable ends. A very cursory
examination of the multitude of decisions by the various federal district courts
all over the United States will disclose immediately that the decisions are more
notable for their uniformity of interpretation than for their diversity. That
is most encouraging for the advocate of uniformity. But is it not putting the
cart before the horse to conclude therefrom that a definite policy of uniformity
is both possible and desirable.
Would it not be better to view the situation realistically and to recognize
that this is not an argument for uniformity, but simply a manifestation of the
fact that the courts do think pretty much alike anyhow and that we are very
apt to have a uniform administration of rules of procedure by all courts acting under such rules? I mention this to suggest the desirability of permitting
the courts to exercise their judgment independently, free from any sense of
compulsion to conform to any uniform system. I believe that thereby whatever benefits are to be secured from a uniform practice will be realized, and,
at the same time, there will be avoided the stultifying effects that inhere in
a system that is avowedly adopted with the idea that it will secure uniformity
at all costs. Uniformity, it seems to me, is desirable up to a point, but beyond
that point it becomes an evil in itself, for the reasons already suggested.
Passing now to the question of uniformity as it applies to the larger
field of both the state and federal courts, the difficulties apparent in the more
limited field are many times multiplied. This is true, of course, because of the
fact that the state courts are sovereign in a large field of the law that is
untouched by the federal court system. This simply means that most of the
cases in the state courts are not directly subject to the rules of decision of the
United States Supreme Court, so that there is not only the problem of interpretation by the lower courts, which I have attempted to show is a troublesome
one, but there is added the factor of many rules of decision arising out of the
courts of last resort of the respective states. While this present a very real
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problem, in the practical sense, and one which would have to be met before
uniformity could be obtained, let us again, for the sake of this discussion,
assume that not only would it be possible to have adopted a uniform set of
rules, but that we could also have a uniform interpretation of the rules.
Again we ask the question-would this achieve a desired result?
The observations already made with regard to the federal courts apply
with even more force to this situation, although perhaps the difficulty here
may not be as extensive as might be supposed. The main difference as com,
pared with the federal courts is that the inherent weakness is multiplied by
one very significant factor-the loss to the whole system of the constructive
criticism of a much larger number of judges who are bound by the rule of
uniformity to the point where they cannot give to the courts and the profession their mature judgments on possible improvements. And when we
deprive our judicial system of the benefits that could be derived from this
source, we most surely have limited, to that extent, the administration of
justice in the field of even substantive law. A procedure which is to remain
uniform for any considerable period of time cannot possibly advance the
application of the substantive law under widely varying circumstances.
I have heretofore assumed a possibility of a uniformity of decision in
discussing the question of the desirability of such a course. I have done this
in order to consider the abstract question alone, stripped of considerations of
expediency. I believe that such a discussion is interesting and valuable, but
it does not completely, it seems to me, express the considerations which should
be taken into account in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of an es,
lished system of uniformity of procedure. The problem cannot really be
stripped of those considerations of expediency. The courts must face conditions and facts as they are, and that includes the practical difficulty already
alluded to of securing a real uniformity of decision and interpretation by all
the courts. The following observation of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Erie Railraad
v. Tompkins, applies with equal force to the courts of the federal system on
issues not determined by the United States Supreme Court, as it does to the
state courts, and presents a most practical answer to the problem of uniformity in actual practice. That statement is: "Experience in applying the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had revealed its defects, political and social; and
the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue. Persistance of state
courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation
between the province of general law and that of local law developed a new
well of uncertainties."
Perhaps it may be said that this statement is truly applicable to those
states only which already had a substantial body of decision on questions of
common law at the time of the decision in Swift v. Tyson in 1842. But the
western states, and particularly the states constituting the Tenth Circuit, had
no substantial body of such decisions in 1842, nor do they have today so
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large a body of such decisions as do the eastern states in the older part of the
country. Will Mr. Justice Brandeis' reference to the "persistance of state
courts" apply equally well to the federal courts in these newer states? How
do we know they will persist in their own opinions? Of course, we do not
know. And there may be considerable force to the argument that they will
not do so, if given the opportunity to follow a rule of uniformity. But it is
submitted that this is not likely, in view of judicial history. They rule of the
Tompkins case itself is a departure from the uniformity that was established
by Swift v. Tyson, and that persisted for almost a century, with only minor
invasions, expressed, notably, in some of the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice
Holmes. If ever a rule of uniformity was established, here was the case. And
yet the Supreme Court itself adopted a new rule of non-uniformity. It is true
that the case involved no positive rule of substantive or procedural law, but
the rule established under Swift v. Tyson recognized that vast body of general
law to which Mr. Justice Story referred when he stated that Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not apply "to contracts and other instruments
of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be
sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." Is there any real reason to believe
that the courts of even this new circuit will feel themselves any more bound
by a set of procedural rules that happen to be in codified form, than was the
United States Supreme Court bound by the clear rule of the case of Swift v.
Tyson on a matter of general law?
The problem must, it seems to me, remain unanswered. I have attempted
to suggest very briefly, the two phases into which it naturally falls-whether
it is at all desirable to have uniformity, and whether it can be achieved in any
event. About the first element, it seems to me, there may easily be considerable
difference of opinion. I have reached the point in my own thinking where I
have grave doubts as to whether we should even try for uniformity. But, at
the same time, I recognize that modern methods of communication and ever
increasing freedom of intercourse among our citizens may demand a judicial
approach that could not be anticipated even so late as 1937 when Erie Railroad
v. Tonpkins was decided. If substantial progress could be made in that direction experience might prove that it is highly desirable. As to whether or not
such a goal is possible of achievement, it is doubtful if there can be any real
difference of opinion. I believe that most people will admit that complete
realization is well nigh impossible. There are those who will contend for the
proposition that partial achievement is at least a step in the right direction,
and well worth trying. It logically follows, from my own doubt as to the
wisdom of uniformity, that I do not advocate even an attempt in that direction.
In concluding, I do not wish to be understood as being opposed to the
federal rules of procedure. I merely contend that such uniformity as follows
the natural interpretation of the rules is desirable, but that it would be un-
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desirable to approach the question from the standpoint that uniformity is the
goal to be achieved. The goal is justice in the administration of the law;
uniformity is a mere useful incident along the way which should be applied
when proper or necessary to achieve the end of justice, but which should not
be sought for its own sake. Public interest does not require uniformity; it
requires justice.

Board of Governors Meets
A meeting of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association
was held at the Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, January 31, 1948.
As the first order of business, the treasurer of the Association, Vernon
V. Ketring, presented his report which included among other things, a statement that in the calendar year 1947 twenty-five per cent of the receipts of
the Association was derived from sustaining memberships as compared to
total dues paid, whereas in previous years sustaining memberships had made
up to fifty per cent of the total receipts of the association.
Mr. Van Cise then outlined the current plans and activities of the Judiciary Committee, informing the board of the constitutional and statutory
obstacles which make difficult the placing of the proposed judiciary revision
recommendations on the ballot this fall. He stated that the committee has
divided the proposals of the committee into three categories: first, those which
are non-controversial such as those dealing with increase of salaries of judges
and retirement provisions; second, the debatable provisions against which some
opposition has been evident and; third, the controversial measures, particularly the non-partisan election features of the plan. Concerning the variance
between constitutional and statutory provisions relating to placing these proposals on the ballot, Mr. Van Cise suggested that it might be possible to secure
the cooperation of the governor in requesting an advisory opinion of the
Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of some of the statutes involved.
If such an advisory opinion were not called, Mr. Van Cise stated a declaratory judgment action might be had in time.
The desire of the committee to subject to a special session if one could
be called on the non-controversiay measures was reported by Mr. Van Cise.
He stated that it was the plan of the committee to attempt to secure from all
members of the legislature their agreement to vote for the non-controversial
matters if a special session were called in the thought that the governor would
then be more amenable to the issuance of such a call for such a session.
Mr. Stanley Johnson then answered the queries of the members of the
board arising in discussion of the proposals made by Mr. Van Cise on behalf
of the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Henderson inquired as to whether there
would be other matters in the call for a special session if one were made. Mr.
Johnson answered that it was possible that school salaries would also be
included if special sessions were called this year. Mr. Johnson suggested that
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if the board did not approve the attempts of the Judiciary Committee to
secure a special session of the legislature the probable alternative should be
to suspend operations of the Judiciary Committee until just prior to the time
the new legislature takes office.
One of the members inquired if there was any organized opposition to
the judiciary plan. Mr. Johnson stated there was none that he knew of and
cited examples of the Colorado Press Association and the Credit Men's Association as being in favor of the plan. Mr. Lattimer stated that the Pueblo
area is in favor of the plan and suggested that the major problem was one of
educating the public.
The board then discussed the political mechanics involved in the question of whether to take the whole of the judiciary plan to the legislators,
which was the suggestion of Mr. Lattimer, or the non-controversial portions
of the plan only, which was the suggestion of Mr. Van Cise and the committee. Mr. Mabry stated that in the Trinidad area the whole of the plan
except the non-partisan features appeared to have approval. Mr. Robinson
stated his opinion as being that the governor would not call a special session
unless a great deal of pressure was put on him. Mr. Van Cise then stated
that the Judiciary Committee was preparing its bills and would distribute
copies of them to all of the legislators within the next two week8 to canvass
the individual legislators' opinions as to whether or not they could support
such a bill in the event that a special session was called and he requested the
concensus of the board. After discussion, it was declared to be the sense of
the board that another meeting of the Board of Governors be held on Saturday, March 20, after the legislators have been interrogated as to their attitude
toward a special session to enact the non-controversial measures of the committee's plan relating to salaries and tenure. The Judiciary Committee was
instructed to make report on its canvass at that time.
Mr. Robinson then read a letter from the chairman of the Committee
on Integration of the Bar, which letter suggested that proposals for integrated
bar might be included in any special session called. Mr. Mabry and Mr.
Calkins stated it to be their opinion that it would be inexpedient at this time
to proceed with proposals for integration by legislative action and it was
resolved that an attempt by the Colorado bar to foster, by legislative action,
any program at integration be temporarily postponed until the Judiciary
Committee problems are concluded, but that it was the sense of the board
that the Integration Committee be invited to attend and discuss this matter
at the March 20 meeting.
The chairman then read letter of Mr. Horace F. Phelps concerning local
associations' committees on grievances which was referred to the state Committee on Grievances to contact the local association committees and work out
a program relating to procedure on grievance complaints and report to the
board on March 20.
Mr. Carpenter then presented a resolution of the Committee on Unauthor-
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ized Practice which was discussed by the board. Mr. Lattimer suggested that
one of the problems of the unauthorized practice committees is that there is
no definite statutory punishment for the unauthorized practice of law and
that if specified punishments were included in the statutes the mere threat
of the punishments would tend to deter those engaged in unauthorized practice. Mr. Carpenter felt that the power to assess punishment is inherent in
the courts. Mr. Carpenter then moved that the Colorado Bar Association
petition the Supreme Court to adopt a rule or rules in substantial accordance
with the proposal of the Denver Bar as embodied in resolution promulgated
by the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the Denver Bar Association dated the 29th day of January, 1948. His motion was seconded and
unanimously carried and the president-elect, Mr. Robinson, appointed a
committee consisting of: Mr. Carpenter as chairman, Mr. Appel and Mr.
Phelps, to present the resolution of the board to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Interim report of the Legislative Committee requesting the action of the
Board of Governors concerning the provisions of the Knutson bill now before
Congress which relate to community property was presented and it was
resolved:
"That the Board of Governors endorses and approves the provisions
of the Knutson bill which provide for division of family income on a
community property basis in all states,"
and the secretary was instructed to inform the chairman of the committee,
Mr Robert Bosworth of Denver, of the board's action.
Submitted by Mr. Wilbur Rocchio of Denver, the interim report of the
Placement Committee was received and placed on file and Mr. Robinson
suggested to the members of the board present that they publicize the activities
of the Placement Committee as to younger lawyers.
Mr. H. Harold Calkins then importuned the Board of Governors with
the annual request of the Junior Bar Section for an appropriation of funds
with which to carry on its work. He reported the activities of the Junior
Bar Section for the ensuing year is being concentrated in public relations, but
stated that his section would continue to offer its aid to any committees and
activities of the parent association. It was resolved:
"That the association furnish to the Junior Bar Section, One Hundred Dollars for its activities within the current year."
After discussion of the visit of the Freedom Train to Colorado this
spring, and other topics allied to the public relations of the bar association,
the board resolved:
"That the Public Relations Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and that of the Junior Bar Section be instructed to present a
concrete program of public relations at the March 20th meeting of the
board."
Mr. Robinson presented the board a report of the Joint Committee on
Professions and submitted to the board recommendation of the committee that
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a joint institute of physicians and attorneys for the consideration of related
problems be held in Denver in the spring, which recommendation was approved by the board. Discussion was then had on the suggestion of the committee that the Board of Governors consider placing one delegate from the
Colorado Bar Association on an inter-professional council now in existence.
It was the sense of the board that the council should be further investigated
and that more definite recommendation be made to the board. Mr. Robinson
stated that a member of the Committee on Professions will report to the
Board on March 20.
The chairman read to the board a letter of Mr. Frank Hickey, chairman
of the Committee on Statutes and Publications, recommending that each
lawyer in the state be canvassed as to his opinion on the need of a new
statutory compilation. His recommendation was opposed by Mr. Appel on
the ground that such a survey would only confirm an already existing consensus that revision is necessary and upon Mr. Appel's motion the board
resolved:
"That the Committee on Statutes and Publications should continue
its work without canvass."
The question of sustaining membership and the amount of dues was then
discussed by the board. The treasurer stated to the board that twenty-five to
fifty per cent of the income of the association was from sustaining memberships and he recommended the continuance of sustaining memberships even
if the association should take action to increase the amount of annual dues.
Mr. Henderson gave it as his opinion that the Greeley area would favor
$10 annual dues but inquired as to whether a dues advance would result in
the publication of Supreme Court opinions. Mr. Wilkes stated that he as
well as many of his fellow lawyers miss the publication of Supreme Court
opinions. Mr. Phelps then reported that the Board of Trustees of the Denver
Bar Association appointed a subcommittee looking to the enlargement of
DICTA policies to raise DICTA to a law review statuts.
It being the sense of the board that specific study of the publication
problems and financial problems of the Colorado Bar Association should be
made before action was taken. Mr. Robinson appointed, as a committee to
study the question and report to the March 20th meeting of the Board of
Governors, the following: Vernon V. Ketring, chairman, Walter M. Appel,
john W. Henderson, Horace F. Phelps, and H. Harold Calkins.
Thereupon the board moved to a discussion of the vacancy now existing
in the office of delegate for this association in the House of Delegates in the
American Bar Association. A motion that the vacancy be not filled temporarily was carried.

New Members of Denver Bar Association
At the March 1, 1948, meeting of the Denver Bar Association the fol-

lowing were admitted to membership:
Robert Guyer Bonham

Wayne D. Calderwood
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Denver Bar Association Will Elect
Denver Bar Association president Horace F. Phelps has appointed a
nominating committee to nominate a president, two vice-presidents, two
trustees, and members of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association. The committee consists of John E. Gorsuch, chairman, and Robert E.
More, Percy S. Morris, Elmer L. Brock and S. Arthur Henry. All suggestions
for nomination should be in the hands of the committee by March 20.

Law Books for Sale
County Judge William Buck, Boulder, has for sale a complete set of
American Jurisprudence. Anyone interested in purchasing this set should
contact Judge Buck at Boulder or Donald Lesher, secretary of the Denver
Bar Association, Midland Savings Bldg., Denver.

Pueblo County Bar Association Elects
The new officers of the Pueblo County Bar Association are:
Riley R. Cloud .......................................................................................... President
John L. Faricy ..................................................................................
V ice;President
Harold C. Rudolph .............................................................. Secretary-Treasurer

Lawyers in Public Service
EDWARD E. NEVANS, JR., has been named Assistant United States Attorney

for Colorado by United States Attorney Max M. Bulkeley. Mr. Nevans resigned as special attorney for the Mountain States section of the Anti-trust
Division of the Department of Justice, which he entered in 1941. He served
in the army from 1942 to 1946, being discharged with the rank of captain
after serving overseas in Africa and Italy.
STANLEY T. WALLBANK is a vice president of the Denver Community Chest.
MARK HARRINGTON, WILLIAM F. MCGLONE and HOWARD S. ROBERTSON are

directors.
MAYOR QUIGG NEWTON is a member of the university council of Yale Uni-

versity. Purpose of the council is to develop plans for the constant improve-.
ment of the school's academic and administrative affairs.

Personals
J. BEISE, BYRON NEID and ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT became members
of the firm of Fairfield and Woods on January 1. The firm offices are at 930
First National Bank, Bldg., Denver.
HELEN C. MYERS has moved her office from the Lawyers Bldg. to suite 605
Majestic Bldg., Denver, phone KE 5175.
CHARLES

Law Books For Sale
I Offer the Following Books Now in My Library
for Sale at the Prices Stated
PACIFIC STATES REPORTS-Extra Annotated, $150. 40 volumes containing all reports of the Pacific States prior to Vol. 1 of the Pacific Rep.
L. R. A. NEW SERIES--Complete in 76 volumes, with 10 volume L. R. A.
Digest and Green Book, $125.
U. S. SUPREME-Complete from 2 Dallas -to date, $300. The Curtis,
Miller, Wallace sets, also 91 to 105 official edition, Sup. Ct. Rep.,
Vols. 1 to 36; L. Ed., Vols. 61 to 90.
Or, would sell the Sup. Ct. Rep. and L. Ed. for $225.
All books in good condition. All prices cash, F.O.B. Alamosa.

I Also Invite Offers for the Following Books:
ILLINOIS-Vols. 1 to 113, Illinois, and Vols. 1 to 77, Illinois Appellate
Court Reports.
PUBLIC LAND DECISIONS-By Department of the Interior. Vols. 1 to 57
with Digest.
MORRISON'S MINING REPORTS
N. Y. CHANCERY REPORTS.
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